

**INCREASED STATE PRESENCE THROUGH THE *UNIDADE DE POLÍCIA PACIFICADORA* IN SANTA MARTA, RIO DE JANEIRO: THE CREATION OF THE CITY'S THEME PARK AND RESULTING SOCIAL ISSUES**

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Abstract: Rio will host both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games and city officials have started a determined plan to regain control of Rio's slums, also known as favelas, from the drug gangs who have ruled the slums for years. Some streets of the slums are now filled with "Police Pacification Units" (UPP) who patrol the streets. The urban poor and urban violence are increasing concerns in Latin America, and this research provides insights into Brazil's attempts to address these concerns. This research sheds light on the effects of the UPP and current municipal programs on favela residents in Rio de Janeiro's first pacified favela, Santa Marta. Through the control of the UPP, state actors and non-state actors are able to use Santa Marta as a type of laboratory to test social projects that bring about positive but also potentially negative impacts on the local community.

Key words: Democratization. Slums. Civilian/military relationships. Urban poverty. Gentrification.

**CRESCIMENTO DA PRESENÇA ESTATAL ATRAVÉS DA UNIDADE DE POLÍCIA PACIFICADORA EM SANTA MARTA, RIO DE JANEIRO: A CRIAÇÃO DE PARQUE TEMÁTICO MUNICIPAL E OS RESULTADOS DE TENDÊNCIA SOCIAL**

Resumo: O Rio será o anfitrião da Copa do Mundo de 2014 e dos Jogos Olímpicos de 2016 e os órgãos oficiais municipais iniciaram um determinado plano de reconquista de controle dos morros do Rio, também conhecidos como favelas, das gangs de traficantes de drogas que dominaram esses morros por anos. Algumas ruas dos morros agora têm Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP), que patrulham as ruas. A pobreza e a violência urbanas são crescentes preocupações na América Latina, e as pesquisas sobre esses temas possibilitam conhecimentos para os quais o Brasil tem se direcionado. Essa pesquisa procura esclarecer os efeitos da UPP e os programas municipais de atendimentos aos residentes de Santa Marta, a primeira favela pacificada do Rio de Janeiro. Através do controle da UPP, atores públicos e atores civis estão aptos para utilizarem Santa Marta como um tipo de laboratório de teste social que traz positivos mas também potencialmente negativos impactos na comunidade local.

Palavras-chave: Democratização. Favelas. Relações civis/militares. Pobreza urbana. Gentrificação.

*“Peace with guns doesn’t exit, and peace without a voice is fear”, (Local Activist and Rapper Santa Marta).*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Gazing up from the bustling Rua São Clemente in Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro on a brisk evening in July, the morro (hill) of Santa Marta gazes down, the lights of the houses twinkling, as if once again inviting me to enter one of the most curious and complex communities I have yet to encounter. Walking up the cobblestone street which winds past several bars full of avid soccer fans and the smell of churrasco, the energy of Santa Marta begins to come alive and provokes questions of how the community came to be. Leaving the paved city streets of Rio de Janeiro and climbing the morro has had historic socio-economic and socio-political significance for those that daily transition from the asfalto (pavement) to the favela and call the morro their home. As the city of Rio de Janeiro prepares to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games slum communities or ‘favelas’ such as Santa Marta are the focus of a determined municipal plan to regain control of areas long controlled by drug gangs. The plan involves the use of “Police Pacification Units” (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora or UPP), a new type of community policing designed to eradicate drug trafficking and reduce crime while at the same time providing a space where community development can be realized. As residents of the first “pacified” favela in Rio de Janeiro, the people of Santa Marta have over three years of experience living in a community occupied by the UPP. While most residents welcome the absence of sporadic violence that once occurred between the gang Comando Vermelho (Red Command) and the police in the past, there is still certain distrust towards the UPP and a certain concern for the daily control that the UPP exerts over the community. Rio de Janeiro’s secretary of public security José Mariano Beltrame plans to establish units in 160 communities by 2014 (BARRIONUEVO, 2010). A new type of controlled environment or urban enclave has been created by the presence of the UPP. With the international spotlight focused on Rio de Janeiro, it is critically important that the effects of the UPP and the dynamics they bring to favela communities like Santa Marta be brought to light. This article presents an attempt at better understanding the resident perspective and experience of living in Santa Marta, a community controlled by a military police force or the UPP. This article presents a discussion on how security and governance are perceived by residents under UPP occupation in Santa Marta and how the UPP have provided a

type of social control which has allowed Santa Marta to become one of the most unique favela communities in Rio in terms of municipal social projects. It has become in effect the city's 'theme park,' a space where the present and future of the community can be created and imagined by whoever has access or power; social programs can be tested here and later implemented in other parts of the city; and outsiders can visit for entertainment or educational purposes. Meanwhile, residents may be left out to occupy the sprouting spaces in a newly created service economy conveniently located at their doorsteps. This is all made possible by the state-sponsored control of their community. Residents are often not guaranteed a voice in the many processes of social change occurring in Santa Marta. The dynamics brought by the UPP in Santa Marta are the result of Brazil's attempts to "pacify" or address issues of urban poverty and urban violence, which are increasing concerns in Latin America.

In an attempt to shed light on the effects of the pacification process in Rio de Janeiro, I address the following question: What is the perception of residents in the favela of Santa Marta regarding the reduction of crime in their favela and the development of trust between the residents and Santa Marta's UPP? Furthermore, this discussion seeks to ultimately answer the question of whether or not the new power structure and security provided by the UPP is a buffer made to strategically expire after the World Cup and Olympic Games or if genuine efforts are being made to incorporate the residents of Santa Marta in a truly democratic way by giving them a voice and feasible and sustainable options for the future. This research is an attempt to provide insights into the complex issue of ameliorating conditions in slum communities through police intervention.

## **METHODOLOGY**

In order to assess resident perceptions of security and change brought to Santa Marta by the UPP, I conducted approximately 20 semi-structured interviews over a seven week period from June to July 2011. Each interview ranged from 20 to 60 minutes in length. In Santa Marta interviews were conducted with residents, the UPP commander, and leaders from the Associação de Moradores (neighborhood association). I also visited three other favela communities, namely the recently pacified Mangueira (June 2011), Rocinha, and Pavão-Pavãozinho. The alternate communities were chosen for participant observation due to the contrasts and similarities they

presented in relation to Santa Marta. Mangueira is not located in the wealthy Zona Sul and is famous for its Samba school. I went to Mangueira several days after police had secured the community. Rocinha at the time of this study was not pacified and was run by the gang Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends). Rocinha, Rio's largest favela with about 70,000 inhabitants and located in the Zona Sul between the districts of São Conrado and Gávea, became occupied by military police starting in November 2011. Pavão-Pavãozinho most resembles Santa Marta due to its population of approximately 5,000, its location in Zona Sul between Copacabana and Ipanema, and also having the presence of the UPP for several years. Participant observation in these communities allowed me to confirm that community experiences with the UPP are overall not homogenous, but do exhibit several similarities in terms of social issues brought on by a military police presence.

## **THE UPP**

The UPP are in large part a continuation of previous community policing models used in Rio de Janeiro such as the Special Areas Policing Group (GPAE) formed in 2000, but was discredited due to corruption and a lack of institutional support. First launched by Rio de Janeiro Governor Sergio Cabral in 2008 with the occupation of Santa Marta, the UPP handle many of the same responsibilities as the GPAE, such as patrolling streets, discussing crime with residents, and opening crime hotlines. Rio's Security Secretary José Beltrame called the UPP "a new tool to end conflicts."<sup>1</sup> This new 'tool' is to be used to "pacify" the violent favelas through a sustained police and state presence. The pacification program and its tools (the UPP) have chosen to use a "clear and hold" approach for the first time. In order for the "clear and hold" approach to be successful, the special forces or BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais) must clear the favela of all drug gang affiliates, the UPP must enter the community, and favela residents must be provided with basic services. Such services are largely coordinated by the UPP Social which was created as the social development side of the UPP. This body's mission is to help coordinate the various branches of the municipal government to implement social programs in the favelas. Their mission is to also incorporate local residents and local social projects that existed prior to the pacification process into the current process of slum development. The goal of this combined approach is

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.upprj.com/en/?p=78>

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ultimately to create safer environments and increase the quality of life for residents in a select number of poor communities. The commander of the UPP in Santa Marta, Captain Andrade, compares this process to U.S. counter-insurgency tactics widely used in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most favela residents are not accustomed to accommodating expenses created by the state control of basic services that comes with the entrance of the UPP such as cable (SKY), electricity (Rio Luz), and sanitation (COMLURB). Apart from a significant economic interest on behalf of the city in “formalizing” the services available to favela residents, the provision of services is also intended to foment long-term ties between the state and the community. The city’s use of counter-insurgency tactics further demarcates the extent to which the municipal government views the favelas as existing outside of state authority. The use of such extreme ‘pacification’ tactics also augments the price local residents must pay for ‘peace’ or what can be defined as a controlled absence of violence. An initial price for peace paid by community residents is noted in the form of watching their neighborhood be invaded by forces in full military tactical gear, having to pay for community services, thus reducing dispensable income, and being submitted to 24-hour surveillance.

This brings us to the community of Santa Marta, located in Botafogo in the Zona Sul (Southern Zone), widely known as one of Rio de Janeiro’s most wealthy districts and home to the renowned neighborhood of Copacabana. Santa Marta has approximately 7,000 residents and more than 1,000 dwellings. Many of the local residents refer to the community as Dona Marta since the beginnings of the community in the 1940’s. Santa Marta was known as one of the most dangerous favelas before UPP occupation due to its lucrative location in the Zona Sul giving drug traffickers easy access to high profit markets in wealthy neighborhoods such as Ipanema and Leblon. As Santa Marta has transitioned from one of the most violent to one of the more peaceful favelas due to the UPP program, the community has been increasingly used by the municipal government to test social programs such as the municipal sponsored “Rio Top Tour” which provides mainly local guides that take outsiders on official tours of the community. Many consider Santa Marta to be one of the most affluent favela communities and some scholars criticize studies done on Santa Marta saying that this economic wealth makes the community too much of an anomaly in terms of UPP experience, suggesting instead that studies should focus more on the neglected Northern and Western zones of the city. However, I argue that within the

anomalies found in a community such as Santa Marta, many insights can be gained into the pacification process, for it is often what we do not see that holds the most explanatory power and insight. I emphasize that each favela community must be understood as a manifestation of a unique history, energy, and culture, therefore every community is worth deeply understanding and contributes a crucial piece to the puzzle when attempting to understand the process of pacification in Rio de Janeiro.

## **HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PACIFICATION IN FAVELAS**

In order to better understand how the favelas have been discussed in scholarly literature I provide an overview of scholarly approaches that will aid in setting up a framework for the current study. As the favelas are some of the most studied slum dwellings in the world there has been significant research done on their history, political makeup, social networks, police structure and social control, and on political evolution, (ARIAS, 2004; ARIAS, 2006; GAY, 1990; HALLOWAY, 1989; MCCANN, 2006). There is also an extensive body of literature on security and violence within the favelas of Rio and most of the literature relates violence and security to the drug trade, organized crime, and Brazil's democratization process (ARIAS, 2006; CALDEIRA 2000; MCLEOD-ROBERT, 2007; NEUWIRTH, 2002; PINHEIRO, 2000; RODRIGUES, 2006; VILLARREAL; SILVA, 2006; ZALUAR, 1995; ZALUAR, 2007). Despite the large body of research done on various aspects of the favelas, there is little research done specifically on UPP and favela resident realities in preparation for an international sporting event. This study provides a much-needed perspective of the residents since democracy in Brazil has not always provided a space for slum residents to publicly voice concerns. The current study is framed in terms of security and governance in relation to Brazil's democratization process; a process which has often caused fragmentation in cities, creating gaps between the rich and poor (ARIAS, 2006; BURSIK; GRASMICK, 1993; CALDEIRA, 2000). There has been substantial research done on security issues in the favelas, mainly focused on violence and drugs (MCCANN, 2006; NEUWIRTH, 2002; PINHIERO, 2000; ZALUAR, 1995), but as I wrote earlier, little research has been done on the perspective of the community and the residents in relation to issues in slum neighborhoods since the pacification process has begun.

In reaction to the lack of a space in society to formally voice concerns related to local communities, favela residents often looked to the local gangs for security and political stability. The gangs often referred to by residents of Santa Marta as the “poder paralelo” (parallel power), became a part of the existing political system, and through their interaction with the state the gangs helped to incorporate favela residents into the formal political system in Rio (ARIAS; RODRIGUES, 2006). Prior to the existence of the UPP, violence was the de facto way for the favela gangs and police to solve conflicts. Police and other institutions of the criminal justice system have often acted more like border guards attempting to protect elites from the poor (PINHEIRO, 2000). This approach to security by the police protected the society from ‘marginal elements’ more than upholding the rule of law. Institutions and militaristic policing expose a problem that often produces the continuous oppression of the poor and takes away their voice. These issues give a historical background that explicates the limited voice of favela residents, an issue that often surfaced during interviews with the residents of Santa Marta.

Theories of disjunctive democracies and social control provide a useful framework that will shed light on the political and social climates that produce slum communities such as the favelas of Rio. The theory of disjunctive democracies serves to explain democratic nations that have transitioned from a military regime type of government structure to a democracy, but still have not entirely reformed the nation’s institutions and still do not guarantee democratic rights to all citizens. Stated differently, the theory says that new civilian governments have underestimated the vigor of authoritarian legacy and have not been able to reform institutions inherited from military regimes (PINHEIRO, 2000). Even while democratic governance is established, the legal system is far from established and furthermore, citizenship is not guaranteed for large sectors of the population. These sectors of the population that are not guaranteed citizenship live in poverty and social inequality.

Brazil started its democratization process in 1978, but this process lacked the aspect of a public discussion on reconciling and understanding the impacts of the military regime on Brazilian society. The military regime in Brazil (1964-1985) fostered an environment of clientelism that was used as an authoritarian manipulation to win votes, avoiding any true commitment to the real needs of voters (ZALUAR, 2007). The government often used corruption and clientelism as a control strategy. Zaluar (2007) argues that due to government

sponsored torture, illegal imprisonment, and censorship, the military regime created a space for the spreading of organized crime (p. 40). It was also during the military regime that the bicheiros, or owners of the illegal numbers game, bought and assumed control of the samba schools and their Carnival processions. As clientelism increased through the toughest years of the military regime, profitable companies such as Samba schools run by bicheiros and corrupt officials, in combination with rigid segmentation on the local level, created a space for shantytowns to be used by armed gangs to manage criminal enterprises. Zaluar (2007) points out that the military personnel involved with organized crime related to illegal gambling and drugs were, until 1988, protected under the “National Security Law” (p. 40). Therefore most of those responsible for the spread of organized crime went unpunished, the consequences of militarizing the police forces were never discussed, and without significant reforms in the justice system the effects of the military regime remain functional in many modern day institutions.

Today Brazil is still characterized by a high degree of social inequality, measured by a large gap between the elites and the general population. This inequality in combination with the remnants of Brazil’s military regime urge us as social scientists to identify and search for solutions to the lingering inhibitors of true social justice and true social change in Brazil. Pinheiro (2000) claims that in a federal system the executive is not sufficient to bring about such change and in order to cause real societal transformation a post-dictatorship government must be able to implement institutional reforms and establish rule of law for all citizens. Rodrigues (2006) echoes Pinheiro by naming several limitations on Brazilian citizens living in a disjunctive democracy: Limited civilian citizenship; inability to become a participating citizen of the nation because of social status; unequal access to the judicial system due to financial costs and the systems’ overall complexity (CALDEIRA; HOLSTON, 1999); and finally, the incapacity of the judicial system to successfully regulate the practices of citizens or the state (RODRIGUES, 2006). Gay (1990) suggests that these limitations can be improved in a disjunctive democracy through increased civic participation which can positively affect trust towards government institutions and police and create lowered levels of perceived risk and insecurity. This research seeks to address this hypothesis as applied to the residents of Santa Marta.

Caldeira (2000) shows another result of democratization in Brazil when she discusses how middle and upper class residents in Brazil view favela residents and moreover provides a good



baseline for framing security in the favelas. Predictably, inhabitants of such spaces are also conceived of as marginal. According to Caldeira (2000, p. 78-82), “Their behavior is condemned: they are said to use bad words, to be immoral, to consume drugs, and so on. In a way, anything that breaks the patterns of propriety can be associated with criminals, crime, and its spaces.” In order to protect themselves and to reject the idea of class equality brought by democratization, the middle and upper class attempt to isolate and distance themselves from the favelas and the inhabitants. This distancing has created ‘cities of walls’ in Brazil which allow the middle and upper classes to feel safe. Caldeira (2000) goes on to argue that the fear of the poor leads the wealthier classes to advocate for policing and for discriminatory policies that give police the freedom to use high levels of violence against an unwanted section of the population (p. 209-210).

Since most residents of the favelas have no way out of their current situation and no resources to substantially change their lives (assuming they want to), they are stuck reliant on whichever gang dominates their favela to be their form of personal security (ARIAS; RODRIGUES, 2006), and to provide them with a political voice. Prior to the UPP occupation of favela communities, the previous gangs were able to maintain order within a certain political logic; a logic or way of politically organizing the community that residents understood and felt that they could successfully operate in their community by exhibiting certain behavior and making certain choices. For example, when the political organization under the command of the gangs was understood by residents, the residents could decide which activities they would partake in such as, doing drugs, going to church, and to some extent decide who to interact with. The consequence of each choice was understood by residents since they were accustomed to the governance provided by the gang. Arias and Rodrigues (2006) frame these personal choices within a certain political logic as crucial decisions that directly impact resident security. Under the UPP the political logic that residents must interact within has changed. The presence of a militarized political body in the neighborhood is still present; they may not be the gang of the past, but does anything change when this militarized body is wearing a polished police uniform? Residents must enter a process of mentally re-learning how to operate within a new political framework in their community. They must ultimately decide how to reconcile the past police sponsored violence and if they will trust the new government initiatives or not. These choices,

which are not faced equally by all citizens in Brazil, come as a result of a great contradiction in how security is viewed in slum communities and in wealthier areas such as Ipanema and Leblon. The paradoxical views on security call into question what constitutes “security” in Rio de Janeiro and who benefits from the many ways security penetrates the slums?

## CREATING THE CITY’S THEME PARK

Resident narratives bring out themes in relation to the UPP occupation process. While some residents express relief for the absence of sporadic violence, most define a unique process of social control that does not address the true needs of residents, but instead backs outside city initiatives for slum communities. Outside initiatives have often been carried out in Santa Marta, a space that is open to those who have power due to the control provided by the UPP. To better understand the creation of the city’s theme park, I start with resident descriptions of the UPP occupation and then resident views on social issues. I start with parts of an interview from a local activist and a local rapper; all of the translations from Portuguese are my own. Each quote has a number identifying first the article section and second the quote. Bracketed phrases signify my own interjections. While all residents courageously gave permission to publish their names, I have chosen to use ‘morador’ (resident) or a pseudonym due to the future of peace that has not yet been guaranteed in Santa Marta. All the quotes from the interviews with moradores are annotated with numerals, as in the following quote.

*1.1.1 [Responding to police presence before the UPP and the initial entrance of the UPP] Santa Marta was the first community [community refers to favela] to be pacified, but Santa Marta is a community that always had a police presence. It was one of the first communities to have a community police station (PPC), it had two PPCs. One up top and one below, but it was a completely ‘desnorteadada’ (bewildered) police force, a type of police that was there and didn’t know what they were doing there, if it was to protect or to hide themselves. [...] Totally corrupt, a type of police that would give orders to the traffickers and they wouldn’t do anything, it was something normal. That policing was becoming a routine, the government came and went, the police stay, then all of a sudden in 2006 Sergio Cabral [Governor of Rio de Janeiro] was elected and in 2008 Santa Marta was without a police presence for 8 months, the police didn’t go to the community, not once. Then one beautiful day, a Wednesday, the police entered the community around 4:30 in the morning. [...] During the summer, the day was already dawning brightly, came the police occupation. More than 300 police officers surrounded the community. There were the first pacification police units of Rio de Janeiro. But the BOPE stayed, the riot police stayed, the civil police stayed, the forest police [Polícia Militar Ambiental] stayed, they [residents] thought that it was just another normal occupation, like they [police] always did, entered and so on. That marks the entrance of the pacification police. (Local activist, age 47, Santa Marta).*

Popular media often times paints the picture that with the pacification process and the UPP presence the favelas experienced a police presence for the first time. As this morador points out Santa Marta always had a police presence and often times the police force in Santa Marta aided in allowing trafficking operations to take place and more often looked after themselves rather than caring about the security of local residents. The official occupation of the community and the beginning of the pacification process came at one of the least suspecting hours of the day, dawn, a large scale operation that obviously confused residents and presented itself as yet another chaotic police operation. It is important to remember that a police force that before presented itself as 'desnorteada' was long established in the minds of the moradores of Santa Marta as unproductive and not trustworthy. Therefore, the initial conception of a permanent community police force intending to better the community was hard for most to fathom. Another morador talks about the entrance of the UPP by first expressing significant frustration with the label "pacification" because "pacification with rifles doesn't exist" and furthermore states that "we were already pacified since the beginning of time." The use of the word pacification by the city and the media often describes the residents of the favelas as barbaric and uncivilized, people in need of a calming force so that they can participate as true citizens of Rio.

*1.1.2 The police [talking about the UPP entering in 2008] entered, there weren't shoot-outs, there wasn't any type of reaction on behalf of the traffickers or the police. The police enter and two weeks later announce that they are the UPP, but all of this is new for the morador, and we always did political interventions to figure out what it is. Then we started understanding just what the UPP is, the police pacification unit that was going to enter and never leave. Speaking about a police force that will respect the morador of the favela, everyone wants that. Those that will, come show respect, come dialogue, everyone will want that. Now, the problem that I see is not the police, 120 officers, that's not the problem, the problem is the institution. When the community understood that the police were going to stay, there was a certain receio (hesitance, misgiving), what would become of such proximity? With the favela and all its crowded becos (alleyways). (Local activist and rapper, late 20's, Santa Marta).*

This particular recount of the UPP entrance into Santa Marta clearly shows that communication between favela residents and the municipal authorities was minimal at best. It was only through "political intervention" that the residents were able to understand the significance of the police raiding their community. Historically the police coming up the morro was a precursor to violence, usually inflicted by the police on local traffickers or by the police on local residents. A 33-year old resident demonstrates this view by describing his vision of the police as "a police that enters the favela, shoots, kills, takes someone to jail and leaves."

Therefore, living in such proximity with the same police force, operating under a new name (UPP), presented a significant challenge for residents as a new part of their quotidian life. The following narrative of a 30-year old resident demonstrates the psychological trauma that some residents may still have from past interactions with the police.

*1.1.3 When he [talking about current 9-year-old son] was more or less 1 year and 4 months old, he saw a police officer attack me while he was sitting on my lap. The officer slapped me in the face, at the same time I placed him [the child] on the ground with a girl and punched the officer in the face. Due to this incident he [the child] became traumatized by the police. He could not see a police car, a scuffle, anything; he would tremble, and bite his nails. (Local tourism student, age 30, Santa Marta).*

Later the resident commented that under the UPP the son has been able to join a music school run by UPP programs and is able to run freely around the community, something the resident stated they could never do at age nine. As the residents struggle with overcoming memories of past encounters with police and forming a new vision of the police, they must also learn how to deal with both new and old social issues in Santa Marta under an altered form of social control that came with the UPP occupation. In order to shed light on the effects of the UPP on social issues, I asked residents what differences they noticed in their daily life before and after the UPP. The local resident whom I have just quoted claims that before, “you would see the traffickers armed from head to toe and today you see the police armed from head to toe. So the uniform has changed.” Many residents echoed this view when asked what has changed in the community since the arrival of the UPP by saying, “Changed? Nothing”! This answer implies that the UPP provide a type of social control that most residents were already accustomed to. The positive side of the social control provided by the UPP is cited by a 45-year-old resident in the following interview.

*1.5 You do not see any more violence. Before, you would see people, you would hear gunshots. Or you would arrive and see a body, or someone injured, or a shootout frequently ending in death. You know? Today you do not see that anymore. (Morador, age 45, Santa Marta).*

The benefits of the absence of frequent shootouts and death must of course be celebrated, but also analyzed with caution. While virtually no violence exists, the opportunity for the violence to return is ever lingering in the minds of residents. As one resident states, “we do not know the day after tomorrow,” there is always a constant fear that the police could leave and cause the violent history of Santa Marta to be once again relived.

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The following resident speaks of the social problems that exist under the UPP occupation. This resident has lived his whole life in Santa Marta and lives in *No Pico* (at the top), one of the poorest parts of the community.

*1.6.1 Social problems include a high index of illiteracy, which we still have, people do not know how to read or write. Problems with trash, people throw it in the valas (ditches, trenches) [usually form part of a rudimentary sewer system]. Chemical dependencies [drug addiction], still exist [...] where is the treatment for people with chemical dependencies? Is it sufficient to just put the police in the favela? Aren't there other problems? Kids out of school, a lot of workers unemployed, lack of awareness [refers to political and social], lack of information, arbitrary police actions [to describe police abusing their power], arbitrary actions by the state, institutional, secretary of the environment, the secretary of urbanism, in relation to removing houses, you see? All as a result of the UPP process, we can say the governor and the city come in the favela and do what they want and we don't have a voice to fight against them, not even for a second. (Local resident, age 30, Santa Marta).*

We must remember that the UPP is formed with officers from the military police that make up an authoritative policing body governed by strict objectives common in any military directive. The question asked in excerpt 1.6.1 about whether or not a police presence in the favela is sufficient is in correlation to this paradigm. A paradigm in which the UPP enters the community as a military body with a specific objective to maintain order and keep the 'parallel power' from returning to the community, succeeds in eradicating sporadic violence, but falls short in its capacity as a military body to address social issues which require an informed understanding of the social issues in Santa Marta. The specific objective of the pacification process, according to the UPP Commander, Captain Andrade, in Santa Marta is to "get rid of the territorial dominance of the traffickers that used to dominate the area, that created their own rules, decided how the community would behave, [...] they dominated through terror, they dominated through fear, they dominated the residents of the community." The pacification process has been successful insofar as accomplishing the objective of eliminating the traffickers, but has filled a space in the community that the state left empty for years. Without the presence of the state, in the form of providing social services guaranteed to residents in parts of Rio not considered favelas, the traffickers were able to fill this space in many favelas and provide such services to residents. These services could include access to medicine, water, electricity, cable television, cooking gas, etc. This providing of services through the imitation of official state roles allowed the traffickers to develop a certain level of co-dependence with residents and therein establish a certain level of trust and respect. The space left empty by the state and filled by the traffickers has

now been filled by the UPP, a state representative body that is able to exert control through military dominance of the community. Residents are unlikely to protest the UPP in confrontational ways due to a still lingering threat of violence. Protesting would mean overcoming a historical memory of police violence while seeing heavily armed UPP officers in the community on a daily basis. The issue that the resident in excerpt 1.6.1 is pointing out is that while the traffickers addressed social issues through unconventional methods that subdued residents to fear mongering and psychological trauma, the UPP have filled the same space in the community, but have not addressed social issues to the same degree. This could be due to the fact that unlike the traffickers, the UPP do not rely on resident's support to validate their power since they are validated and recognized by the nation state. This leaves the residents to rely on other government agencies such as the UPP Social and other parts of the municipal government and NGO's for aid. This brings us to the next important point; the state's occupation of a space long filled by the 'parallel power' requires the need to learn how to implement social programs for favela communities. Due to their unique organization and history, the favelas require a different approach to ameliorating social issues than communities that have always experienced a state presence, they are not primitive versions of the more 'modern' neighborhoods of the city, they should be seen instead as historically unique and as effected by unique social movements, thus producing a different type of community.

Rather than confess its naivety in terms of designing and implementing social projects in the favelas to local residents and asking for their help, the state has instead used Santa Marta as a type of laboratory to test social programs and implement successful projects city wide. This laboratory has allowed for the testing of other exploitative projects to take place in the community as well, such as real estate and commercial speculation, a point I will demonstrate later on. This laboratory is able to function uncontested as a result of the social control provided by the UPP. A theme park has ultimately been created in Santa Marta. The community has become a place where those who wish to test new programs, whether social, or business endeavors can come and do so. Previously, the residents were dominated by the traffickers, but at the same time the traffickers needed the support of residents to maintain power and to ultimately negotiate with the state. The residents and the neighborhood association were critical

in the networks that formed between the state and the traffickers. Now the residents are not needed for any type of validation of power.

The president of the Associação de Moradores, José Mario, describes the UPP as only one tentáculo (tentacle or part) of the state that allowed for the entrance of other state governing bodies to function in the community (i.e., Secretaria de Cultura (culture), Secretaria de Esporte (sports), Secretaria de Obras (public works)).

*1.6.2 They came [The UPP] and permitted other tentacles of the state to come act inside the community. Therefore, from that point on they [the state] could no longer consider our community as a community, [could not be considered as a favela, but instead as a part of the 'formal' city] as a risky area. Today Santa Marta is not considered a high risk area; therefore the state has no reason to neglect us, nor the municipal government to neglect us, nor the government officials to neglect us. Today the secretarias (branches of government) have to act here in Santa Marta. [...] It must be a true change, not a façade, and not a plastificação (cover up). (José Mario, President, Associação de Moradores, Santa Marta).*

One of the principal jobs of the president of the Associação de Moradores in Santa Marta, according to José Mario, is to ensure that the various government offices are indeed doing what they are supposed to do in the community. From what I observed in terms of government projects in the community, it appeared as though the government has good intentions in terms of improving neighborhood infrastructure and resident quality of life. However, we must carefully considered the following tendencies: 1. The entrance of the UPP signifies an increase in utility costs for residents, such as, water, electricity, television, and gas, due to the fact that all of these services become formalized and pirated systems tend to be eliminated. 2. Although utility costs are increasing, employment opportunities are not readily available and likewise, the salaries of residents do not increase. 3. The property value inside the community increases, sparking real estate interest from large investors due to the location of the community in Zona Sul. 4. Tourism becomes a common occurrence within the community hosting approximately 3.000 tourists per month, due to excellent views of Rio and an old drug trail which runs from the top of the community to the Corcovado. 5. City development projects within the favela, such as the construction of the bonde (tram) causes the removal of houses and residents. Real estate speculation also contributes to this phenomenon. The next excerpt demonstrates the fear a lot of residents have in relation to real estate speculation and government infrastructure projects.

*1.7 Let's say that that, since this process [pacification] as promising as they think it is, was just another source of exploitation., in terms of hotel chains, gastronomic chains, commercial chains. So where the morador was forgotten, discriminated, where there were only hobos, gangsters, prostitutes, and mulatas Sargentelli, today for the mega corporations this is just another area of exploitation. Do you really think that until 2016 the poor moradores will be living in the favelas? Or could it be that they will be filled with mega corporations, luxury condos, and mega installations of hotel and gastronomic chains? (local resident, age 30, Santa Marta).*

What many residents interviewed fear is a process of gentrification that is subtly occurring in Santa Marta and in other favelas located in lucrative areas of the Zona Sul. The process occurring in places like Santa Marta is not a new phenomenon; it has occurred and is occurring in many major cities across the globe. It is important to understand that the traffickers of the past provided a shield for the community of Santa Marta. This shield kept the residents isolated from the state, but also kept mega-corporations from exploiting the community and did not allow the cost of living to fluctuate. With the social control provided by the UPP, the cost of living has risen and the residents are exposed to various forms of exploitation that they are not adequately prepared to confront. If the city arrives at the top of the favela and claims that a house is in a “high risk” area and must be removed, where do those residents end up? According to one resident they send you to “a peripheral area where there is no type of infrastructure for you to survive, very distant from the city center.” Likewise when the city decided to build a tram that provides public transportation from the bottom of the community to the top, all of the residents in the path of the tram lost their homes. This tram is now shared by the residents and the 3.000 monthly tourists.

## **THE COMMUNITY RADIO**

In order to decipher the unique process happening in their community and to better learn how to live with the UPP, the residents originally created a community radio station that has since been shut down by the government on the grounds that it was a pirated station. The following resident describes the radio station which was originally created in response community issues and in response to police aggressions in the community. The hope was that a community radio would provide a space to dialogue about issues in the community and would create outside support.



## INCREASED STATE PRESENCE THROUGH THE *UNIDADE DE POLÍCIA PACIFICADORA* IN SANTA MARTA, RIO DE JANEIRO: THE CREATION OF THE CITY'S THEME PARK AND RESULTING SOCIAL ISSUES

2.1 Due to the aggressions [police related] there was a need to start a community radio station. For eight months the community radio worked really well in terms of informative programs, educational broadcast, a lot of debates, a lot of people were coming to the favela to learn about local issues, it was creating visibility, it became visible. It became too uncomfortable, Anatel (national telecommunications agency) and the federal police came, and they closed the community radio station. [Asked if such action goes against democratic right] Communication, free expression, it does, doesn't it? They do this type of thing in the favela because it's not important for you to have a vehicle of communication, they alleged that the radio was pirated, but dang, pirated radio is when you are making money. We did not make any money; it was all done by volunteers. (Local resident, age 35, Santa Marta).

With the closure of the radio station, the moradores lost an important vehicle used to voice opinions, learn about their changing community, and to attract outside support and awareness. This action further demonstrates a lack of resident involvement in the reformation of their community. The major media outlets such as Globo and the New York Times are able to paint the picture that with the arrival of the UPP the community is happy and all is well. This image upholds the message to the international community that Rio is taking the necessary steps to ensure a safe and civilized environment for the World Cup and Olympic Games.

## CONCLUSIONS

The process of pacification carried out by the UPP has brought an absence of violence for the time being and has reduced crime in the community to an occasional domestic dispute, according to Captain Andrade. However, the process has also brought a higher cost of living for residents and has opened up the doors to various corporations. One resident nicely outlines the increased cost of living:

*3.1 When the UPP enter, the corporations enter, in reality the UPP come to guarantee the entrance of these corporations and with it real estate speculation, the increased cost of our lives, today it is surreal. Rent in this territory, in this space here [where interview took place], would have been R\$150 (\$86USD), today its R\$300(\$173USD), R\$400(\$231USD) and there is no more available space. (Local resident, age 28, Santa Marta).*

Most residents stated that the minimum salary is R\$545 (\$315USD). This means that over half of a person's salary goes to pay rent, leaving a minimal amount of money for other necessities. Since the salaries of the residents have not increased at the same rate as the cost of living many are forced to leave the community and live in much poorer zones of the city. Another alternative would be to share a small apartment with an entire family and divide the rent.

This process is common in almost all cases of gentrification around the world, what differs is the way in which living costs become too great for local residents to remain in their community. In the case of Santa Marta, living costs have increased over a period of several years due to the social control provided by the UPP which eradicates violence and allows for the entrance of corporations (banks, beer companies, gas, electricity, etc.) and also due to the location of Santa Marta in the Zona Sul. The infrastructure provided by the companies coming in from outside the community must be combined with solutions to provide residents with a salary that allows them to accommodate increased living costs. The UPP Social was created to help with this very problem; however, most residents cited it as being something absurd that sells a certain image of what is happening in the favelas to the outside world.

A militarized process to confront the problems found in slum communities may force traffickers out of a community and eradicate sporadic violence. However, there is a danger that after the initial occupation of the community, the military body becomes a façade, which ends up blocking the outside world's view of the processes occurring in the community. The media often focuses on what the UPP keep out of the community, but it is also important what the UPP let into the community and how the power of capitalism allows for the community to be taken advantage of in terms of real estate and labor. Social service organizations must guarantee that the façade provided by the military is taken down and that security is provided to residents while they are incorporated into the changes occurring in their community. Most residents hailed local tourism as being a positive mechanism to promote outside awareness and create jobs for residents. If tourism is to become an income generating mechanism for residents, they must be the leaders of the enterprise, for it is through the sharing of their history, their community, and their local culture that tourism is validated in Santa Marta.

In its boldness, a military body often captures our attention, the power instilled in the hands holding rifles are able to take our attention away from the true issues in places of military occupation. The media also provides a message that upholds the façade in places like Santa Marta. One local resident described the media in the following way: “The media hugs; she shakes the hand of the dictator, and shakes the hand of the pastor, the Pope.” With the process of pacification, the media has shaken the hand of the UPP and the international community while the residents of Santa Marta are becoming ever more pacified. The many residents fighting for

change in their community, fighting for a voice, must be empowered. Before the entrance of the UPP there were social programs, a unique history, a unique culture, and a unique energy within Santa Marta. What came before the UPP must be seen as valid, not barbaric and uncivilized; the community's past must be seen as crucial to informing the present and creating solutions for the future of Santa Marta and its residents.

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